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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Petitioner appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for 
post-conviction relief.   Petitioner asserts that the district court has 
essentially made a class of claims effectively unreviewable. This is 
because the court held as to some (unobjected to) claims,  that they were 
forfeited because they could have been brought on appeal but were not, 
while at the same time holding that  there is no claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failure to raise an issue on appeal as 
fundamental error.     
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in its unpublished opinion from the 
direct appeal, State v. Roberts, docket 42535 (Idaho Ct. Appeals 
9/17/2015  unpublished) explained  the facts as follows: 
Based upon evidence submitted at trial, on September 1, 
2012, at 4:11 a.m., the Boise City Fire Department responded 
to a report of a fire at a residence and firefighters were on 
scene within three to four minutes. Boise firefighters 
extinguished the fire located on a patio in the back of the 
house and observed several canisters near the fire’s origin 
that smelled of gasoline.  
 
A fire investigator observed a broken window near the fire 
damage, which appeared to have been broken from outside 
the residence. The investigator also observed canisters 
containing gasoline placed around a flower pot with one of 
the canister’s nozzles placed directly into the pot. The valve 
of a fire-damaged propane tank attached to a barbeque grill 
on the patio was turned to the “on” position. Based on these 
observations, the fire investigator concluded that an ignitable 
liquid was poured onto a part of the patio and the fire was 
intentionally set, but that the fire largely burned itself out 
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before it reached the interior of the house. He testified that 
the fire burned for approximately six to eight minutes before it 
was extinguished. 
 
Boise police investigators found blood stains around the 
broken window. Several samples of the stains were collected 
and sent to the Idaho State Lab for testing, which 
presumptively matched the DNA of Steven Roberts. The 
officers then obtained a DNA sample from Roberts, which 
confirmed his DNA at the scene of the fire. Roberts was 
charged with one count of arson in the first degree, Idaho 
Code § 18-802; burglary, I.C. § 18-1401; and a persistent 
violator enhancement, I.C. § 19-2514. Roberts waived his 
right to a jury trial and requested a bench trial. 
 
At trial, Roberts testified in his own defense. He testified that 
on the night in question, he took his girlfriend’s car without 
her permission and met up with his friend, J.M., at a bar. After 
meeting up with J.M., he went to the residence in question 
with a woman he had met  earlier that night and who told him 
the house was haunted. He testified that something 
frightened him while he was there so he ran, tripped, and fell 
through the window on the back porch, cutting his arm. He 
then returned to the bar to meet up with J.M. Roberts denied 
setting a fire or touching any gasoline cans while at the 
residence. 
 
J.M. also testified at trial, stating that Roberts left the bar 
several times during the evening, including a couple of hours 
before closing time. He testified that Roberts last returned to 
the bar a few minutes before closing, around the time that 
everyone was leaving, and that the business closes at 4:00 
a.m. He also testified that Roberts smelled of gasoline and 
had a cut on his arm. When asked, Roberts told him he had 
been in a fight. Roberts’ girlfriend testified that he told her he 
cut his arm by falling against a dumpster. 
 
The district court found Roberts guilty of burglary and arson in 
the first degree. Roberts then admitted to being a persistent 
violator. The district court imposed a unified thirty-year 
sentence with ten years determinate for arson in the first 
degree, and a concurrent unified ten year sentence with five 
years determinate for burglary. 
 
State v. Roberts, p. 1-2 (footnote omitted).   
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The court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for 
Summary Dismissal (hereinafter Decision)  continues to explain the 
procedure: 
Roberts appealed his arson conviction on grounds that the 
State presented insufficient evidence in support, namely, he 
relied on the time estimates provided by the responding 
firefighter, who opined that the fire was set between 4:07 
and 4:11 a.m., and that provided by Jesse, who testified that 
Roberts re-appeared at the bar around 3:55 a.m. Thus, 
Roberts argued he could not have been present when the 
fire was started. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
conviction, noting that the "minimal discrepancy in the 
witnesses' estimate is not so significant as to nullify the 
State's evidence of Roberts' guilt in light of the other 
evidence against him (i.e., being on the property and 
smelling of gasoline)." 2015 WL 5511096, *2. 
 
Decision, p. 3. (R. p. 171.) 
 
 Thereafter, Mr. Roberts filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction 
relief with affidavits in support.  (R. p. 5-19.)  At his request, counsel was 
appointed, but no amended petition was filed.  (R. p. 169.) Mr. Roberts did file an 
additional pro-se affidavit in support which clarified, amended, and withdrew 
some of his claims. The state filed a motion for summary disposition, and a 
hearing was held. (R. p. 169.)  
 The court granted the state’s motion and summarily dismissed the petition 
in a written decision. (R. p. 169-188.) A separate judgment was filed. (R. p. 189-
190.) 






THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY DENIED THE 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF PETITION BECAUSE THE EFFECT OF 
ITS RULINGS  MAKE CERTAIN CLAIMS UNREVIEWABLE  
 
A. Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal  
 
 An application for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code § 19-
4901 is civil in nature and is an entirely new proceeding distinct from the 
criminal action which led to the conviction.  Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 
494 (Ct.App. 1994).   In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, 
the applicant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Id.     
 Summary disposition is the procedural equivalent of summary 
judgment under I.R.C.P. 56, with the facts construed and all reasonable 
inferences made in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759 (Ct.App. 1991).   Allegations contained 
in the verified petition are deemed true for the purpose of determining 
whether an evidentiary hearing should be held.  Martinez v. State, 125 
Idaho 844 (Ct.App. 1994).    If the allegations do not frame a genuine 
issue of material fact, the court may grant a motion to summarily dismiss, 
but if the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must 
conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id.      
 In determining whether a motion for summary disposition was 
properly granted, the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most 
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favorable to petitioner and determines whether, if true, they would entitle 
petitioner to relief. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995). 
B. Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of 
 Counsel 
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984).  The "benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied 
on as having produced a just result."  Id. at 686. 
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy 
in order to be entitled to relief.  The defendant must demonstrate both that 
his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.  
Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. 
State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986). 
More specifically as to allegations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel based on tactical decisions, the Court of Appeals explained in 
Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396 (Ct. App. 2013): 
This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tacticalor 
strategic decisions of counsel will not be second-guessed on 
appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings 
capable of objective evaluation. There is a strong 
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presumption that counsel's performance fell within the wide 
range of professional assistance.  
 
Id., p. 385-386 (internal citations omitted). 
 
 
C. The Claims and the Court’s Rulings 
 Petitioner made many claims, but only a few are at issue in this 
appeal.  They involve claims that the court summarily dismissed because 
they could have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal.    The court’s 
Memorandum Decision dismissed them as follows: 
A. Judicial Misconduct 
1. Improper Inferences 
Roberts contends that [the] Court improperly relied on its 
own scientific assumptions in rejecting Roberts' story that he 
broke the window by tripping and falling through it. Namely, 
the Court stated at sentencing: 
 
[F]rankly I found your testimony ... pushing the limits 
of physical impossibility. Given where the window was 
broken at, the thickness of the window, how much 
running speed you could have gotten up to in those 
few feet from your chair to where your window was, 
you would have almost to have jumped on a 
trampoline and had a helmet on and tried to go 
through the window like a spear at a level well above 
what you would be at just running. It was clear that 
the physics of where the window was broken, how 
thick it was, the fact that you claim you broke the 
window by running and tripping headfirst into the 
window, I don't find that credible. I don't find it frankly 
practicable to have happened that way at all. 
 
Tr., p. 693:8-23.  
 
Roberts contends that there was no evidence presented at 
trial through which the Court could reasonably make this 
inference. Namely, there was nothing presented regarding 
the thickness of the window, Roberts' body weight, the 
speed required to break the window, or supporting the idea 
that the location of the break was incompatible with the law 
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of physics. Robert argues that this evidence is the type of 
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" that 
must be presented by an expert, not simply assumed. 
 
The State argues the claim is barred as forfeited since it 
could have been raised upon direct appeal. Bias v. State, 
159 Idaho 696, 702, 365 P.3d 1050, 1056-67 (Ct. App. 20 
15). Roberts acknowledges that this is the general rule, but 
points out that there is an exception to this rule where "the 
asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the 
reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise 
of due diligence, have been presented earlier." ld. Roberts 
contends that his claim falls under this exception because he 
was not aware of the Court's reliance on its own 
assumptions until sentencing. However while this may have 
precluded Roberts from objecting at trial, it in no way 
precluded him from being able to raise the issue on direct 
appeal. He filed the appeal after the sentencing hearing and, 
therefore, could have raised it.  Consequently, the claim is 
summarily dismissed. 
 
2. Denial of Right to Present Defense 
Roberts also argues the Court erred by denying Roberts the 
opportunity to call an expert witness regarding how the 
window was broken and provide opinion that Roberts' body 
could not have broken the window. Along this same vein, 
Roberts further complains that the Court asked clarifying 
questions of State's witnesses regarding how the window 
broke, but did not ask similar questions of Roberts. Had the 
Court asked, Robert contends he could have responded to 
the Court's concerns. 
 
Again, the State correctly argues that the claim is barred 
because it could have been raised on direct appeal. Bias. 
supra. Roberts has offered no reason why, in the exercise of 
due diligence, it could not have been raised at the time of 
appeal. Thus, it is summarily dismissed. 
 
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct 6 
Some of the photos disclosed by the State prior to trial 
included those from a prior murder/arson investigation at the 
Randolph Property. Roberts contends that the prosecutor's 
failure to identify prior to trial which photos would be used at 
trial prohibited Roberts' counsel from calling an expert 





The State correctly argues that the claim is barred as 
forfeited since it could have been raised upon direct appeal. 
Bias. supra. Roberts has not established why the claim could 
not have been raised earlier; indeed, he does not address 




6 A second basis asserted by Roberts for 
“prosecutorial  misconduct" was the prosecutor's act 
of ''vouching'' for Jesse McPhie's credibility at trial, 
despite the fact that Jesse had given conflicting 
testimony at the preliminary hearing. Roberts 
subsequently withdrew this claim. 
 
7 In addition, while the Court does not rely on this 
ground for dismissal, there is no duty on the part of 
the prosecutor to reveal sequence of prosecution; if 
items were discovered, then defense has all notice it 
needs to defend against charges. 
 
Decision, p. 5-6.  (R. p. 173-174.) 
 
 Relevant to these claims are the court’s rulings regarding appellate 
claims:  
 
4. Appellate Errors 
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court commented on the duty 
of appellate counsel to criminal defendants, noting: 
 
Appellate counsel is not required to raise every issue 
available to the defendant. This Court has recognized 
the United States Supreme Court precedent that 
appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty 
to raise every non-frivolous issue requested by 
defendant. Rather, to demonstrate deficient 
performance of appellate counsel for failure to raise a 
claim on appeal, the defendant must show that 
counsel made an objectively unreasonable decision to 
omit the claim. Accordingly, appellate counsel is not 
deficient merely for omitting an argument as the 
weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as 
one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. 
When reviewing appellate counsel's performance, we 
determine whether, but for appellate counsel's errors, 
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a reasonable probability exists that the defendant 
would have prevailed on appeal.  
 
Crawford v. State, 160 Idaho 586, 377 P.3d 400, 411 (2016), 
internal quotes and cites omitted. 
 
In addition, the Court has noted: 
 
Indeed, it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was 
incompetent based on failure to raise a particular 
claim on appeal. Only when ignored issues are clearly 
stronger than those presented will the strong 
presumption of effective assistance of counsel be 
overcome. 
 
Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139, 146, 344 P.3d 919, 926 
(Ct. App. 2015), internal cites omitted. 
 
Decision, p. 16 (R. p. 184.) 
 
 Later in the Decision the court  stated: 
 
b. Failure to raise issue of judicial abuse of discretion 
Roberts contends his appellate counsel failed to challenge 
the Court's abuse of discretion by relying on its own 
application of subjective scientific standards to reject 
Roberts' account of his fall through the window. He contends 
that, even though his trial counsel did not object to the 
Court's statements, appellate counsel could have raised this 
issue as fundamental error. The State contends that Roberts 
may not raise this claim against appellate counsel. The State 
is correct.  
 
ln Mintun v. State, the Court of Appeals rejected the attempt 
by the petitioner to assert an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim against appellate counsel tor failure to raise a 
"fundamental error'' on appeal. 144 Idaho 656, 662, 168 
P.3d 40, 46 (Ct. App. 2007). The Court cited to four reasons 
for this decision. First, a rule deeming appellate counsel 
ineffective for failing to raise an issue of fundamental error 
would force appellate attorneys to raise on appeal nearly all 
possible errors, whether preserved by objection in the trial 
court or not, to avoid the risk of being declared ineffective. 
Id. Second, it is often not to a criminal defendant's 
advantage to raise an issue of fundamental error on direct 
appeal because the record in the criminal proceeding may 
not be adequately developed for a full presentation of the 
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defendant's claim. Id. Third, a trial attorney's failure to object 
to inadmissible evidence or other potential errors may be 
done for legitimate strategic or tactical purpose, and the 
record on appeal would rarely show this strategy. ld. Fourth, 
allowing such a claim against appellate counsel is 
unnecessary to protect a defendant's rights because the 
defendant can bring the same claim of impropriety in the trial 
proceedings as a claim of ineffective assistance of his trial 
counsel for failing to object to the alleged error in the trial 
court. Id. 
 
Under Mintun, Roberts' claim against appellate counsel for 
failure to raise judicial abuse of discretion cannot proceed. 
The claim is dismissed. 
 
Decision, p. 17-18. (R. p. 185-186.)  
D.  The Court’s Rulings Create a Class of Claims Unable to be 
Reviewed and are, Therefore, Erroneous 
 The court has created a class of claimed error that is essentially 
unreviewable.  First, the court held that various errors are forfeited by the 
failure to raise them on appeal. Then, the court’s rulings on  ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel show that it is for all practical purposes 
non-existent.  The combination of these two things whipsaws the 
petitioner, his claims are dismissed because they were not raised on 
appeal by appellate counsel, but he cannot challenge appellate counsel’s 
failure to raise claims on appeal.  
 To further explain using the claim of judicial misconduct as an 
example,  the court  again ruled as follows:   
. . . Roberts contends that his claim falls under this 
exception because he was not aware of the Court's 
reliance on its own assumptions until sentencing. 
However while this may have precluded Roberts from 
objecting at trial, it in no way precluded him from being 
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able to raise the issue on direct appeal. He filed the 
appeal after the sentencing hearing and, therefore, could 
have raised it.   
 
Decision, p. 5-6 (emphasis in the original). (R. p. 173-174.) 
 
 So the court acknowledges that the error was not objected to in the 
trial court.  Thus, it would have to be raised as fundamental error. But 
then, as to the claim that appellate counsel failed to raise the judicial 
misconduct as fundamental  error, the court holds: 
He contends that, even though his trial counsel did not 
object to the Court's statements, appellate counsel could 
have raised this issue as fundamental error. The State 
contends that Roberts may not raise this claim against 
appellate counsel. The State is correct. 
 
Decision at p. 17. (R. p. 185.) 
 
 The same is true for the claims that Petitioner was deprived of the 
right to present a defense and prosecutorial misconduct.  The court ruled 
they could have been brought on direct appeal and so dismissed them. 
However, they were not objected to and so appellate counsel’s failure to 
raise them as fundamental  error is not reviewable.1  
 Further, even if the errors were objected to, as the district court 
explains,  it is still exceptionally difficult to establish ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel for failure to raise an issue on appeal. This is 
because it requires a showing that the omitted issue was clearly stronger 
than those raised. 
 
                                            
1 As an aside, it seems doubtful that these claims could have been 




 Thus, the combination of the rulings is that for all practical purposes 
claims that could have been brought on direct appeal but were not cannot 
be brought in a post-conviction because they are forfeited, and then 
appellate counsel’s failure to bring those claims cannot be reviewed, either 
expressly for unobjected  to claims and for all practical purposes for  
preserved claims. Thus, the court has created an entire class of claims 
that are not subject to review and has therefore erred.  
  
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the district court’s order summarily dismissing 
his petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and remanded to the 
district court.   
DATED this 11th  day of September, 2017.    
         
/s/ Greg S. Silvey  
      Greg S. Silvey 







CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE 
 
 The undersigned does hereby certify that the electronic brief 
submitted is in compliance with all of the requirements set out in I.A.R. 
34.1, and that an electronic copy was served on each party at the 
following email address(es):  
 
Idaho State Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
ecf@ag.idaho.gov    
        
 Dated and certified this 11th  day of September, 2017. 
 
 
        /s/ Greg S. Silvey                         
       Greg S. Silvey 
